Denver Airport Baggage Handling System

Overview

This vignette describes system engineering issues related to the development of the Automated Baggage Handling System for the Denver International Airport in the period 1990 to 1995. The computer controlled electrical-mechanical system was part of a larger airport system.

Vignette Description

In February1995 the Denver International Airport was opened, 16 months late with a delay cost of $500 million dollars. A key schedule and cost problem was a unique feature of the Airport: an "Integrated Automated Baggage Handling System". The baggage system was designed to distribute all baggage, including transfers, automatically between check-in, the aircraft and pick-up on arrival. The delivery mechanism consisted 17 miles of track on which 4000 individual, radio-controlled carts would circulate. The $238 million system consisted of over 100 computers networked to one another and to 5,000 electric eyes, 400 radio receivers and 56 bar-code scanners, with the intent to ensure the safe and timely arrival of every piece of baggage. Significant management, mechanical and software problems plagued the automated baggage handling system. In August 2005, the automated system was abandoned and replaced with a manual one.

The automated baggage system was far more complex than previous systems. As planned, it would be ten times larger than any other automated system, have an ambitious schedule, utilize novel technology, require shorter baggage delivery times, and as such, it involved very high risk. A fixed scope, schedule, and budget arrangement precluded extensive simulation or physical testing of the full design. System design began late: it did not begin until well after construction of the airport was underway. The change management system allowed acceptance of change requests that required significant redesign of portions of work already completed. The design did not include a meaningful backup system – for a system that required very high mechanical and computer reliability. The system had an insufficient number of tugs and carts to cope with baggage expected, and this along with severe timing requirements caused baggage carts to jam in the tracks and for them to misalign with the conveyor belts feeding the bags – the result was mutilated and lost bags.

The baggage system problems could be associated with the non-use or misuse of a number of system engineering concepts and practices: system architecture complexity (SEBoK 2.6.1), project scheduling (SEBoK 3.6.1), risk analysis (SEBoK 3.6.3), change management (SEBoK 3.6.6), system analysis and design (SEBoK 3.3), system reliability (SEBoK 3.8.3.2), system integration (SEBoK 3.4.2), system testing (SEBoK 3.4.3), and insufficient management oversight (SEBoK 3.6.2).

Summary

The initial planning decisions, the decision to implement one airport wide integrated systems, the contractual commitments to scope, schedule and cost, and the lack of adequate project management procedures and processes led to a failed system – attention to system engineering principles and practices might have avoided such failure.

References

[Calleam 2008] Case Study – Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System – An illustration of ineffectual decision making, Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008. (http://calleam.com/WTPF/?page_id=2086)
[Gibbs 1994] Gibbs, W. W., Software’s Chronic Crisis, Scientific American, September 1994.
[Neufville 1994] Richard de Neufville, The Baggage System at Denver: Prospects and Lessons, Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.1, No.4, Dec., pp. 229-236, 1994.

Citations

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Primary References

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